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1. FOREWORD 
This report is intended to provide a conceptual framework for assessing the 
security risk to power systems assets and operations related to malicious attacks. The 
problem is analysed with reference to all the actors involved and the possible targets. 
The specific nature of the malicious attacks is discussed and representations in terms 
of strategic interaction are proposed.  Models based on Game Theory and Multi Agent 
Systems techniques specifically developed for the representation of malicious attacks 
against power systems are presented and illustrated with reference to applications to 
small-scale test systems. 
This report is the fruit of a cooperation between Politecnico di Torino – 
Dipartimento di Ingegneria Elettrica and the Joint Research Center of the European 
Commission – Institute for the Protection and the Security of the Citizen. 
This document is organized as follows. In chapter 2, the problem of malicious 
attacks to critical infrastructures is described; chapter 3 analyzes the nature of 
malicious attacks and provides an evaluation of their potential cost and impact; the 
basic concepts of game theory and the examples for modeling the strategic 
interactions so as to assess the risk of malicious attack are introduced in chapter 4; 
multi-agent system model for studying coordination/cooperation and some applicative 
examples are provided in chapter 5; finally, conclusions are drawn in chapter 6. 
 
2. INTRODUCTION  
A vast number of hazards threatens public facilities both due to accidental 
reasons and intentional attacks; both of them may have disastrous social and 
economic effects. Deliberate attacks have always drawn particular concern; especially 
nowadays that international terrorism has become a very serious problem. 
Consequences of malicious attacks are usually serious, because they are intentionally 
performed for damaging a particular target. Some recent attacks provide terrifying 
examples: on September 11th 2001 four aircrafts crashed in the US and about 5000 
people were killed, in Madrid 199 people were killed in train station bombing on 11th 
March 2004, while in London, suicide bombs killed 56 people and injured more than 
700 others on 7th July 2005. 
Among public facilities, the infrastructural systems for electric power delivery 
have a particular importance, since they are widely distributed and indispensable to 
modern society. Attacks against power systems may cause vast social and economic 
damage; hence power systems are a well known target for malicious attacks, also 
because they are constrained by specific physical laws that can be exploited to obtain 
the greatest effects from the attack.  
Electrical systems are wide infrastructural systems that deliver the electricity 
generated by power plants to end-consumers. The main feature of power systems is 
their articulation in several networks operated at different voltage levels. They are 
usually divided in three subsystems: generation, transmission and distribution. 
Moreover, national power systems are usually connected with those of the 
neighbouring countries by high voltage tie-lines, thus establishing a continent-wide 
interconnected system.  
The basic goal in operating power transmission systems is to transport 
electricity from the generation centers to the load centers in a reliable and secure 
manner. These systems must be operated within given thermal, voltage, and stability 
limits under a wide variety of conditions such as continuous variations in load, 
equipment unavailability and failure, wide range of weather and climatic conditions 
etc. . 
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Outages of power systems may have severe impacts on a country in many 
respects. The different events that may affect the electrical or physical integrity of a 
transmission system are due to various causes, which can be grouped in the following 
categories [1][2]:  
1) natural causes such as lightning, storms, cold, ice, forest fires, and geomagnetic 
storms;  
2) electro-mechanic,  control and communication equipment failures, with either 
immediate or latent consequences that may only affect the system when the 
equipments are called into operation; this kind of failures can affect power system 
components, such as generators, transformers, and/or transmission lines; control 
and protection systems, such as hidden failures in protective relays, 
malfunctioning of circuit breakers, interacting controls, control failures, or 
misoperations; information and communication systems, such as loss of 
communication with energy management systems, inability to perform automatic 
control and protection functions, failures or congestion of the information 
systems, and intrusion of external agents into the information/communication 
systems; 
3) human factor including human errors that are not intentional; examples are faulty 
settings of control and protection systems, system operator errors, manual control 
errors, and failure of operating personnel to follow the guidelines established for 
secure power system operation;  
4) malicious threats, that are intentional attacks to the power system infrastructure; 
they can be physical or cyber attacks and can be simultaneous outages of power 
equipment (sabotage, bombing, etc…), simultaneous outages of communication 
equipment, and sabotage through communication system. 
 
In the last decades the introduction of competition in the electricity industry 
depicted a completely new scenario in which the centralized decision making 
approach characterized by a vertically Integrated Industry has been replaced by the 
decentralized decision making process of a number of competing market players. In 
this new context the issues related with systems security, also against malicious 
players, propose new challenges and need to be revised.   
 
 
2.1 GROWING CONCERN FOR THE SECURITY OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES 
Malicious threats might target infrastructures such as power systems, water 
systems, public traffic systems, which are vital to the whole society and may cause 
very severe consequence once the failure happens. Different infrastructures may be 
considered as: 
• power systems: there are some weak points in the power transmission system, e.g. 
the attack to some special nodes or lines will possible result in black out and 
cause big economy loss[3][4][5]; 
• hydro (water) networks: hydro networks need to face the malicious destruction of 
the network and the attack with intentional toxicant drain in the water network, 
with the help of the modern science of chemistry and biology, the toxicant or 
pathogen may cause very serious problem to the people in terms of  epidemic 
diseases[6]; 
• gas and oil networks: the attack to the gas/oil network can influence the market 
price of the fuel, there will be the consequence on the economy and on the lack of 
energy resources, which will not be soon reflected by people daily life[7]; 
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• informatics networks: with informatics networks attacked, there will be the 
problem of communication and media, the out of control of the informatics 
networks will lead the society to panic[3]; 
• transportation networks: as the subway systems have been attacked by the 
terrorists as in London and Madrid, the attack on transportation network is very 
quick to be known by the people and hugely influence the people’s daily life, and 
the people suffer that directly, especially from psychology point of view[7][8].  
 
All the systems listed above are critical to people’s lives, because their failures 
are often disastrous for the whole society, in that they bring big economy losses and 
political and social problems altogether. Attacks to the transport systems seem to be 
the most practiced in recent times, especially against the public transport 
infrastructures like civil aircraft, railways and subways. However, malicious activities 
against other networks could cause very severe consequence as well. For example, the 
accidental blackouts of power systems that took place in the US and Italy pointed out 
the vulnerability of those systems and the huge impacts of such events (US blackout 
9300 km2 and 50 millions of inhabitants involved, 39 G$/day of economic lost; Italian 
blackout 57 millions of inhabitants, 4 persons died, 120 M€ of economic loss).  
In that respect, it may be recognized that other sources of raising concern like 
international criminal organisations may share with international terrorism some 
goals, e.g. blackmailing countries by menacing public security, as well as the most 
immediate targets, critical infrastructures that affect public life, and the concrete ways 
to perform attacks – bombs and cyber attacks for instance. 
Hence, although the aims and the goals in those two international threats to 
public security are profoundly different, to all respect those differences will be rather 
immaterial in front of our purpose that is the modeling such threats and the specific 
attacks patterns is such a way as to be able to devise the most effective countenance 
and response strategies to such threats. 
The impact of malicious attacks to critical infrastructure may be very serious for 
several reasons: 
? the reliance on infrastructures of all societal  and private functions; 
? most probably attacks are explicitly designed to maximize damage and 
psychological impact on the public – as demonstrated by the Madrid and London 
cases; 
? infrastructures are interconnected, and therefore cascading and escalating effects 
cannot be excluded.  
A key concern relates to targeted attacks, e.g. against control and communication 
systems of critical infrastructures, or contemporarily against the physical 
infrastructure and its control system, as pointed out by the recent Communication of 
the Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection in the fight against terrorism: 
“The consequences of an attack on the industrial control systems of critical 
infrastructure could vary widely. It is commonly assumed that a successful cyber 
attack would cause few, if any, casualties, but might result in loss of vital 
infrastructure service. For example, a successful cyber-attack on the public telephone 
switching network might deprive customers of telephone service while technicians 
reset and repaired the switching network. An attack on a chemical or liquid natural 
gas facility’s control systems might lead to more widespread loss of lives as well as 
significant physical damage.”[9]  
The same communication points out how power systems might be the most 
specific target for such attacks, due to the synergistic effect with other infrastructures: 
“Another type of catastrophic infrastructure failure might be when one part of the 
infrastructure leads to the failure of other parts, causing widespread cascade effect. 
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Such failure might occur due to the synergistic effect of infrastructure industries on 
each other…Cascade events can be very damaging too, causing widespread utility 
outages. The blackouts in North-America and Europe during the last two years have 
put in evidence the vulnerability of energy infrastructures and consequently the need 
to find effective measures to prevent/or to mitigate the consequences derived from a 
major supply disruption.” [11]Although the main focus is on terrorism, other sources of 
malicious attacks are to be considered as both widespread and potentially very 
harmful, organised criminality in particular. 
Power system failures cause severe consequence to regular daily life. The critical 
dependence of advanced economies upon electric power involves that power failures 
have wide socio-economic consequences, and provoke important psychological 
impact on the public. The blackouts and brownouts that happened in Europe and the 
United States in the last years showed that a vast number of hazards can threaten the 
system due to accidental reasons. In addition, they have revealed the potential 
vulnerability of the system to malicious attacks. Other than the direct economic losses, 
the New York City blackout of 1977 gives an example of how the blackout brought 
incredible social impacts to the people: “Looting and vandalism were widespread, 
hitting thirty-one neighborhoods, including every poor neighborhood in the city. In all, 
1,616 stores were damaged in looting and rioting. 1,037 fires were responded to, 
including 14 multiple-alarm fires. In the largest mass arrest in city history, 3,776 
people were arrested. Many had to be stuffed into overcrowded cells, precinct 
basements and other makeshift holding pens. A Congressional study estimated that 
the cost of damages amounted to a little over US$300 million.”[9]  Moreover, in recent 
years, the blackout or the disruption of the power system are frequently take places in 
the world, for instance, in the summer of 2003, the blackout/disruption concentrated 
within 6 weeks and hugely affected the lives of 112 million people in 5 countries [10]: 
 1) August 14, 2003- North East blackout over the US and Canada  
 2) August 28, 2003 - Southern London distribution  
 3) September 23, 2003 - Danish/Swedish blackout  
 4) September 28, 2003 - Italian transport grid collapses.  
Despite the cause of the problem, and due to the increasing interconnectivity of 
the grid, a failure of the electric power infrastructure may have disastrous effects over 
a broad geographic area, even crossing national borders.  
 
2.2 CLASSIFICATION OF THREATS TO INFRASTRUCTURES  
There is no generally accepted definition of threat. From the legal point of view, 
a threat by an agent consists of the unwanted (deliberate or accidental) expression of 
intent to execute action that may result in harm to an asset. Therefore, a threat is the 
potential occurrence of a negative action, not its actual realization. In the case of 
critical infrastructures, the consequence of an attack can be much more serious that 
originally intended. 
Threats to infrastructures can be broadly classified into two main categories: 
physical and cyber threats. The first category includes any action aimed to destroy 
some physical components of the network. For power systems,  targets may be,  
power stations, transmission lines, transformation sub-stations. The second category 
includes deliberate actions to cause failure in the communication systems that are 
used to monitor and control the systems; for instance, communication links over 
power lines and other telecom channels to carry tele-metering signals,  power system 
control software etc.. Tab.2.1 reports three different types of physical threats., while 
Tab.2.2 provides a list of cyber agents that might jeopardise critical infrastructures.  
Table 2.1 - Physical threats to Critical Infrastructures  
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Threat Description 
Natural Hazards  Natural disasters have accounted for a large percentage of 
the malfunction of the infrastructure, Geomagnetic storms, 
earthquakes, forest fires and tsunamis all represent significant 
natural hazard threats to the critical infrastructure. 
Accidental threats Accidents are, by definition, unforeseen, and therefore, 
difficult to predict. 
Malicious threats Infrastructures have long been targets for malicious attack, 
whether for criminal military or political purposes. There are a 
range of actors, employing a range of tools (from conventional 
weapons, weapons of mass destruction- including chemical, 
biological radiological and nuclear agents) who have displayed 
a willingness to engage in malicious activity direct to physical 
critical infrastructure. Four major objectives in describing an 
aggressor’s behavior are: 
? destroying or damaging critical facilities, property, or 
equipment 
? stealing or damaging critical equipment, materials 
? posing a threat to the safety of personnel or customers 
? creating adverse publicity. 
Table 2.2 - Cyber threats to Critical Infrastructures 
Threat Description 
Crackers, Malicious 
hackers, Script–
kiddies 
All these figures refer to individuals with certain knowledge of 
computer and communication systems, which break into systems 
violating security measures. They sometimes crack into networks for the 
thrill of the challenge or for bragging rights in their community. While 
remote cracking once required a fair amount of skill or computer 
knowledge, one can now download attack scripts and protocols from the 
Internet and launch them against victim sites. Thus, while attack tools 
have become more sophisticated, they have also become easier to use. 
Insider threat 
The disgruntled organization insider is a principal source of computer 
crime. Insiders may not need a great deal of knowledge about computer 
intrusions, because their knowledge of a victim system often allows them 
to gain unrestricted access to cause damage to the system or to steal 
system data.  
Malware writers 
Malicious code writers produce software designed specifically to 
damage or disrupt systems, such as a virus, a worm or a Trojan horse.  
These are normally known as malware. They can be specific (target to 
particular systems or even organisations), or generic. 
Criminal groups, 
organised crime 
There is an increased use of cyber intrusions by criminal groups who 
attack systems, mainly for monetary gain. These groups might try to get 
internal information for blackmailing the company, or to extort by 
menacing the dissemination of some sensible information, or to commit 
different types of fraud (e.g. influencing some prices), or forgery (e.g. 
changing values in bills). 
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Hacktivists 
Hacktivism refers to politically motivated attacks on publicly 
accessible Web pages or e-mail servers. These groups and individuals 
overload e-mail servers and hack into Web sites to send a political 
message. 
Their activity against infrastructures can be motivated by 
environmental, safety, or nationalistic reasons – but this is hardly related 
to the targeted systems. The objective of a certain action could be to stop 
a certain infrastructure from carrying out their normal operations. 
Terrorist groups 
Terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or 
property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or 
any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.  
Terrorism has targeted infrastructures, but mainly from the physical 
viewpoint. Few cyber–actions have been registered. Attacking 
infrastructures could be an effective way to jeopardise governments, or 
intimidate the citizens of a country. 
Information warfare 
Several nations are aggressively working to develop information 
warfare doctrine, programs, and capabilities. Such capabilities enable a 
single entity to have a significant and serious impact by disrupting the 
supply, communications, and economic infrastructures that support 
military power—impacts that can affect infrastructures as one key column 
of a country. 
 
Source:  [12] 
 
 
2.3 ACTORS IN CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES 
Different actors are involved in the context in which terrorist threats and attacks 
are implemented. Malicious attackers wish to implement attacks to infrastructures in 
such a way as to maximize the impact on the public and stakeholders, while 
government, authorities and stakeholders act in such a way as to minimize risks and 
effects of the attacks. We can define the three main actors as: 
Attacker:  the individual or organization aimed to provide damages to the 
infrastructures; malicious attackers may include experts with professional 
knowledge about the power system, able to assess the impacts of the 
attack to a specific target; 
Defender:  all the forces committed, at various levels, to protect the potential targets, 
such as government, police, power system operator (SO); 
Sufferer:  common people that will suffer of the attacks and may put pressure for 
fear on the government to change his policy. 
 
Fig.2.1 shows the basic interaction among the above actors referred to malicious 
attacks.   
Potential attackers may retaliate the defender organisations by threatening to 
implement attacks once their demand is declined by the defender organisations. 
Defender organisations, namely the  government, may compromise with the terrorists 
under pressure from the public opinion. .This is a complex interaction, which should 
be carefully studied. Networked infrastructures such as power systems, transportation 
networks, water supply networks etc. are widely distributed systems, so that  the 
effects of localized attacks are amplified: the attack to just one component of the 
system can provoke a major failure of all the system due to its structure and to the 
physical and operational constraints that need to be met. 
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Fig. 2.1 - Interaction scheme among the players in malicious attacks 
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3. MALICIOUS ATTACKS AND DEFENCE STRATEGIES 
A malicious attack is a set of actions that specifically aim to do harm upon a 
target system. They are premeditated, with a motivation that can be political (e.g. 
terrorism), illegal (e.g. organized crime) or just malevolent (e.g. hackers) and 
executed by threat agents who may be totally external to the system or have internal 
access to and/or knowledge of it. 
In the case of critical infrastructures, the consequence of an attack can be much 
more serious that originally intended.  
 
3.1 NATURAL VERSUS MALICIOUS THREATS  
By threat we mean potential adversarial events. When we study the security of 
the infrastructure, for instance power systems, there are two types of security control. 
One is the preventive control and the other is the corrective control. The former one is 
to take countermeasures before the happening contingency while the latter is 
performed after the contingency. From this point of view,  threats are to be analysed 
in view of  discovering vulnerabilities of  preventive controls.  
 
Natural threats 
 
Natural threats are potential adversarial events that occur without the man’s 
intentional intervention.  Such threats are due to inner component failures during 
system operation due to aging etc., unintentional mis-operation of the system, and  
other natural phenomena such as atmospheric discharges (lightning), animals, winds 
etc. which may impact on the operation of the infrastructure.  All these failures are the 
subject of statistic studies, based on which the research branch of reliability was 
developed.  
 
Malicious threats 
 
Malicious threats imply a willingness to make damage, which is a critical topic 
to the security of the infrastructures. In that respect, some features of the malicious 
threats are to be emphasized: 
• malicious threats are selective, the more the target may produce disruptive effects 
the more it is likely to be attacked; 
• malicious threats are selective, as more as the target is protected as less will be 
likely to be attacked; 
• the level of threat, for a given component, depends on the attitudes, decisions and 
interaction between attackers and defenders at a given point in time and space; 
• malicious threats are always referred to criminal or illegal activity 
 
Comparison between natural and malicious threats 
 
There are huge distinctions in various aspects between malicious versus natural 
threats. The conventional methods for dealing with natural threats are not applicable 
to malicious ones. In malicious threats, strategic interaction among players determines 
the probability and the real occurrence of an attack in time and space, while natural 
based threats to power system occur on random base (nature has no specific 
willingness to hurt, nature is a “random” player). In other words, a malicious threat 
modifies the probability distribution of the contingency, so that the contingency 
corresponding to more severe consequences and easier attack implementation will be 
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assigned extra probability of occurrence due to the consideration of malicious threats. 
Tab. 3.1 introduces a side by side comparison of the two threats.   
Tab.3.1 - Comparison between the natural and malicious threats 
 NATURAL THREATS MALICIOUS THREATS 
MOTIVATION accidental rationally deliberately 
DISTRIBUTION ON 
THE SYSTEM random critical component preferred 
RISK ASSESSMENT probabilistic approaches (Monte Carlo simulation) rational interactions models 
COUNTERACTIONS re-enforce the system 
1. re-enforce the system 
2. preemptive measures against 
terrorists 
STRATEGIC 
INTERACTION No yes 
PLAYERS 1. SOs 2. sufferers 
1.SOs 
2.terrorist organizations 
3. government 
4. sufferers 
 
3.2 IMPACT OF ATTACKS AND DEFENCE/ATTACK COST 
Europe counts for many infrastructural systems that for their importance for 
national security and societal welfare are critical, and should be protected 
accordingly. Due to their geographical extension and to technological evolution it is 
difficult to determine the more appropriate level of protection. Moreover,  pervasive 
application of information and communication technologies (ICT), and market 
liberalisation introduce many new opportunities for malicious threats, and the 
consequent happening and cascading of dangerous events.  
The understanding of the infrastructural risks caused by deliberate man–made 
actions should be done in the context of a systematic Security Framework. Once the 
problem is framed, it would be possible to conduct a Security Assessment, i.e. a risk-
oriented analysis of the system for the analysis of the assets that could be menaced by 
internal and external threats.  
However, a crucial issue in this process is how to profile the behavior of a 
malicious intruder in the system, in such a way as to select the most appropriate 
defensive pattern, while the attack develops – taking into account that the intruder 
also learns from the defender while this deploys his defense.  
In the following, we focus on power transmission grids. The subsystems and 
components to be considered are: 
• Transmission lines: composed of towers, cables/wires and insulators. 
• Substations: composed of building, control and communication systems, 
transformer and breaker. 
• Control Centre: composed of building, operators, control and communication 
systems 
A critical issue for analyzing the scenarios related to malicious attacks is referred to 
the assessment of the impacts that malicious action against power system can provide. 
Different types of impacts need to be considered. The usual way to assess the 
impacts of a failure in power system is related to the amount of unserved energy. An 
average economic value of unserved energy can be computed as the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) divided by the energy consumed per annum. Taking the case of Italy, 
we have: 
6
9
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Of course the value of the unserved energy can be weighted somehow on the 
location in which the energy is not provided since it may be more important, for 
example, a big town than the countryside. A different method to evaluate the 
economic impact of electrical energy interruptions is through direct assessment of 
customers. Starting from the consideration that customers are themselves the most 
able in characterizing the impact of interruptions, this method is based on surveys of 
the subjective costs or losses that the customers suffer for different kind of 
interruptions (time of occurrence and duration). Even if significant efforts, in terms of 
number of customers involved and time, are needed to obtain meaningful results, the 
direct assessment is currently the most appreciated method. 
In addition to  the economic impact, other impacts should be considered such as 
those related to psychological and social disorders, and given an equivalent economic 
value to make them comparable and additive in the analysis. 
The possible defense actions can be classified in on-line and off-line 
interventions. For the offline intervention, some devices and the related costs are 
reported in Tab.3.2.. 
Tab.3.2 - Defense actions and corresponding cost per subsystem and component 
MEASURE DESCRIPTION COSTS 
Control and 
Protection 
systems 
These devices either react 
automatically to faults or 
report to operators the grid 
state for further action. 
- Load shedding relays: 3000 € 
per apparatus, 1000 installed in 
Italy. Hence to duplicate their 
number would cost 3 € Mio;  
-The Critical sections (with 
foreign countries), 20 
apparatus, cost 50 k€ per 
apparatus + 500-600 k€ for the 
central SCADA, called Energy 
Management System (EMS). 
 
Power 
electronic 
devices 
Series compensation, phase 
shifters. These devices 
change the impedance of 
one line 
The cost can be estimated at 
about 50 € per kW 
Interruptible 
loads 
large consumers accept a 
contract type that allows 
the provider to interrupt 
electricity delivery 
Their equivalent cost is some 
300 € Mio per annum in Italy 
New transport 
lines 
Can be built to strengthen 
the grid 
Some .2-.3 € Mio per km in 
Italy  
Cybersecurity 
measures 
e.g. improved firewall, 
access control and 
intrusion detection systems 
- 20 K €  per substation 
- 100 K €  per Control centre 
Physical 
protection 
including the hardening of 
buildings, fencing, 
protecting walls, etc. 
.5 – 2 € Mio per target 
 
Attackers need to put some human resources and physical – and cyber - 
resources (e.g. explosives, delivery tools etc) in targeting a system component. While 
the cost of the former is of course difficult to quantify the latter is more predictable; 
anyway, both those monetary and non monetary aspects of an attack need to be 
quantified in monetary units;  they depend on the components, their location, their 
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protection level etc.. A gross economic evaluation of the cost of physical resources to 
perform attacks per component is given in Tab.3.3. 
Table 3.3 -  Attacks and corresponding cost per subsystem and component 
Subsystems Components Attacks Measure Cost (K€) 
Poles Physical Bomb 50 
Cables/Wires  Physical Short-circuit 10 Lines 
Insulators Physical Projectile 10 
Building Physical Bomb 100 
Cyber DOS 50 
Cyber Intrusion 100 
Control &  
Communication 
system Physical Cut/Destruction 500 
Transformers Physical Bomb 1000 
Breakers Physical Bomb 100 
Substations 
 Physical Short–circuit 50 
Building Physical Bomb 1000 
Operators Physical Incapacitation  100 
Cyber DOS 100 
Cyber Intrusion 500 
Control centre Control &  
Communication 
system Physical Cut/Destruction 1000 
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4. MODELLING OF THE STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS IN MALICIOUS 
ATTACKS 
In summary, malicious attacks are carried out by intentional attackers, who are 
rational in terms of maximizing the impacts they can get from their actions, choosing 
the most influential targets. Power systems are characterized by severe physical and 
operational constraints that need to be met to keep their operation feasible; those 
constraints may be known by attackers skilled and trained enough to take advantage 
so as to maximize the effects of their attacks by exploiting the amplifying effects that 
those constraints imply. The possibility to implement successfully those attacks and 
their actual outcome depend on the counter measures undertaken by the defenders - 
the government and their police and defense forces, stakeholders etc.. Defense actions 
may discourage the attackers and prevent possible attacks to given targets; the 
decisions of each part influences the decision of the other, so that this problem may be 
classified, as a strategic problem where complex interactions take place among the 
players[13]. Proper models are needed to represent such a context and the outcomes of 
those studies are useful to predict the behavior of the terrorists and help the authority 
to design proper defense plans and actions.   
. 
 
4.1 GAME THEORY APPLICATIONS TO MALICIOUS ATTACKS MODELING 
 
Game theory was originally devised to model conflict situations and was 
successfully applied for modeling the interplay among different actors in several 
fields e.g. information technology [15], transportation industry[16], stock market [17], 
electricity market [18][19] and sociology[20][21].  More broadly, game theory proved to be 
a useful tool to model complex relations inside economic, political, cultural problems 
wherever it is needed to model human activities in a strategic scenario, where the 
factors involved may range from political to economical, religious, national, 
technologic, historic, cultural issues.   
 
4.1.1 DEFINITIONS 
 
Game theory is devoted to the formal study of conflict and cooperation. Game 
theory concepts apply whenever the actions of several entities (players) are 
interdependent in the sense that the utility got by a player in the games depends on the 
move of others players. These agents may be individuals, groups, firms, or any 
combination of these. The concepts of game theory provide a language to formulate, 
analyze, and understand strategic scenarios. 
Game theory was introduced in 1944 by Von Neumann and Morgenstern [22]. In 
1950, John Nash proved that Nash equilibria must exist for all finite games with any 
number of players [23]. In the last 50 years, game theory becomes a crucial tool for the 
analysis of strategic behavior of individuals and particularly for studying competition 
among the companies in an oligopoly markets. 
 Game theory is concerned with the actions of decision makers who are 
conscious that the actions of their competitors affect their utility.  
The essential elements of a game are players, actions, payoffs, and information. 
These are collectively known as the rules of the game, and the modeler’s objective is 
to describe a given scenario in terms of the rules of a game so as to model the context 
and figure out what will happen in that scenario.  
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The hypothesis  of the rational player,  according to which each player will act 
so as  to maximize a measure of his/her own utility,  is assumed. 
The basic elements of a game are defined as follows: 
 
Players: individuals/entities that make decisions 
Action set:    choices available for each player 
Payoff:    utility that each player receives at the end of the game 
Strategy:     a rule that tells a player which action to take at each instant of the game, 
given his information set. 
Game order: order of moves in non simultaneous game. 
Information set: knowledge available to each player when he/she decides the action 
Nature:  a non-player who takes random actions at specified points in the game 
with specified probabilities 
 
Two different types of strategies can be considered in the game:  
 
Pure strategy:  each player chooses with unit probability only one move in the 
action set; 
Mixed strategy:   each players individuates a probability distribution over the action 
set; to each move corresponds a probability and the probabilities of 
all moves sum up to one. 
 
and the payoff structures can be set with reference to two possible alternative schemes: 
 
Zero sum games:  the measure of the total utility to all the players in the game, for 
every combination of strategies, always adds to zero. One wins 
exactly the amount one's opponents lose. 
Non-zero sum games: a gain by one player does not necessarily correspond with an 
equivalent loss by another.  
 
Other features of the games are: 
  
Cooperative/non-cooperative game: players are able/unable to make enforceable 
agreements. 
Symmetric/asymmetric game:  a symmetric game is a game where the payoffs for 
playing a particular strategy depend only on the other 
strategies employed, not on who is playing them. 
Otherwise, it is a asymmetric game.  
Static (simultaneous) game:  in static game, all players make decisions 
simultaneously, without the knowledge of the 
strategies that are being chosen by other players, or if 
they do not move simultaneously, the later players are 
unaware of the earlier players' actions (making them 
effectively simultaneous). 
Dynamic (Sequential) game:  a game where one player chooses his action before the 
others chooses theirs and the later players must have 
some information of the choice of the previous players.  
 
The most important aspect in a game is the possibility to find an equilibrium. 
Therefore the equilibrium represents the searched outcome of the game; it is 
determined by the intersection of the strategies actually chosen during the game by all 
players. 
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Information context 
 
In game theory, an information set indicates what a player knows when it is 
his/her turn. With respect to the information of the game, several conceptions are 
defined:  
 
• perfect/imperfect information: perfect information means that in the game, each 
player knows every action of the players that moved before him/her at every point, 
while the imperfect information is defined as games where a player does not 
know exactly what actions other players took up to that point. 
• complete/incomplete information: in the game with complete information, 
knowledge about other players is available to all players. Every player knows the 
payoffs and strategies available to other players. Otherwise it is a game with 
incomplete information. 
• symmetric/asymmetric information: in the game with symmetric information, no 
player has information different from those of other players while asymmetric 
information means that there exists difference in the information the players have. 
• certain/uncertain information: certain information is used to describe a game in 
which all players know exactly what game they are playing in the sense that they 
know what the payoff of playing a particular strategy will be given the strategies 
played by other players. Particularly in the context of extensive form games, a 
game of certain information is to be defined as any game in which nature does not 
move after the players have moved. 
 
Equilibrium types 
 
• Strong/weak dominant strategy equilibrium  
 
A strategy Si* is said to be a dominant strategy if the player, with its choice, gets 
his/her maximum payoff, for whichever move of his/her counter parts, in formula: 
πi(Si*, S-i) > πi(Si’, S-i) ∀ S-i ∀ Si’≠Si*   
where:  
πi is the payoff of the i-th player 
S-i is the strategies of the i-th counterparts. 
 
A weak dominant strategy differs from a strong one only for the weak inequality: 
πi(Si*, S-i) ≥ πi(Si’, S-i) ∀ S-i , ∀ Si’≠Si  
Equilibrium with a strong/weak dominant strategy is represented by a combination of 
moves that are strong/weak dominant strategies of the players. 
 
• Nash equilibrium 
 
A Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies, one for each player, such that no player 
has incentive to unilaterally change his/her action. Players are in equilibrium if a 
change in strategies by any one of them would lead that player to earn less than if 
he/she keeps the current strategy.  
The strategy profile S* is a Nash equilibrium if no player is motivated to change their 
move if the others do not. In formula: 
 
∀ i    πi(Si*, S-i*) > πi(Si’, S-i*)   ∀ Si’ ≠ Si*   
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where: 
S-i* is the strategy of i’s counterparts at equilibrium. 
A Nash equilibrium is optimal according to Pareto. 
 
• Pure strategy equilibrium/mixed strategy equilibrium 
 
pure strategy equilibrium, in which each player chooses one and only one move in the 
action set; 
mixed strategy equilibrium, in which a strategy consisting of possible moves which 
corresponds to the probability distribution (collection of probabilities, can be a 
measure of the possibility of taking the corresponding action). 
 
Existence/uniqueness of equilibrium 
 
In a game, generally speaking, it is not sure that an equilibrium exists or that it is 
unique. Some particular criterions are drawn as: 
• in a game with a finite number of actions, Nash equilibrium always exists, at least, 
with mixed strategies; 
• if an  equilibrium with dominant strategy does exist then it is unique. 
 
4.1.2 THE SEARCH FOR AN EQUILIBRIUM 
  Every participant in the game would like to maximize its utility, which is 
influenced by the decision of the other players. With all the factors that may impact 
the payoff of the players taken into account, the approaches for finding the 
equilibrium can be concluded as follows: 
• A simultaneous game can be given a matrix representation in a Strategic (or 
normal) form. For two players, one is the "row" player, and the other, the 
"column" player. Each row or column represents a move and each box represents 
the payoffs to each player for every combination of strategies moves. Generally, 
such games are solved using the concept of a Nash equilibrium [22][25]. In the case 
of three players, as illustrated by Fig.4.1, the normal form can be displayed as a 
three dimension matrix with strategies (a1, a2…) for player A, (b1, b2 …) for 
player B, (c1, c2 …) for player C  and corresponding payoffs as entries.   
 
 
Fig.4.1 - Three dimension normal form representation of the game 
 
• Deletion of dominated strategies as a way to approach the equilibrium; it is one 
common technique for solving games and is based on iteratively removing 
Player B 
Player A 
c1 c2 
c3 
c4 
b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 a1 
a2 
a3 
a4 
a5 
Player C 
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dominated strategies. In the first step, all dominated strategies of the game are 
removed, since rational players will not play them. This results in a new, smaller 
game. Some strategies -- that were not dominated before -- may be dominated in 
the smaller game. These are removed, creating a new even smaller game, and so 
on. 
• Intersection of the best response functions, the best response is the strategy (or 
strategies), which produces the most favorable immediate outcome for the current 
player, taking other players' strategies as given. The concept of a best response is 
central to the Nash equilibrium which is dependent on each player selecting the 
best response. From another point of view, we can find Nash equilibrium of a 
game in which each player has only a few actions by examining each action 
profile in turn to see if it satisfies the conditions for equilibrium. In more 
complicated games, it is often better to work with the players’ ‘best response 
functions’. 
• Backward induction is an iterative process for solving finite extensive form or 
sequential games. First, one determines the optimal strategy of the player who 
makes the last move of the game. Then, the optimal action of the next-to-last 
moving player is determined taking the last player's action as given. The process 
continues in this way backwards in time until all players' actions have been 
determined. Eventually one determines the Nash equilibrium of each subgame of 
the original game [26]. 
• Uniform expected payoff of the nonzero probability actions for the mixed strategy 
equilibrium. It is a useful approach derived from the characterization of mixed 
strategy Nash equilibrium,  in which the probability assignment to the 
defender’s/attacker’s actions should make uniform the utilities of the 
attacker’s/defender’s nonzero probability actions. Moreover, the utility of the 
nonzero probability actions should be greater than that of the zero probability 
actions. 
 
4.1.3 APPLICATION OF GAME THEORY TO STRATEGIC INTERACTION IN MALICIOUS 
ATTACKS TO POWER SYSTEMS 
 
As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, a strategic interaction takes 
place in malicious attacks, which is suitable to be described by game theory. The 
game theory application is confined by some rational hypothesis, which may not be 
true in reality due to the limitation of the players’ capability and the information set 
they have. 
Sandler, Tschirhart, and Cauley[27]  present some rational–actor models that 
depict the negotiation process between terrorists and government policy makers for 
incidents where hostages or property are seized and demands are issued. In this model, 
terrorists’ valuation of the likely concession to be granted by a government is based 
on a probability distribution conditioned on past government concessions. Their 
analysis illustrates that the terrorists’ choice and actions are influenced by those of the 
government and vice versa.  
Especially after the disaster of Sept.11, 2001, many research efforts investigated 
application of game theory to threats to critical infrastructures. Sandler and Arce [28] 
listed six strengths of modern game theory for revealing quantifiable factors 
theoretically underlying the behavior of terrorists and targeted governments: 
• captures the strategic interactions between the game players, namely the 
terrorists, the government, the common people, that can make decisions 
independently; there are direct conflicts among those players, hence whatever 
decision made by one player will surely influence the behavior of the others; 
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• helps discover the strategic implications when each side acts according to its best 
guess about how the other side thinks; 
• incorporates the impact of threats and promises from each side; 
• takes advantage of the observation that players tend to maximize goals subject to 
constraints, and every one involved in the conflict has its own definite objective; 
• helps predicting outcomes in bargaining over demands; 
• acknowledges the impact of uncertainty—incomplete information—on all the 
above. 
 
Basically, existing researches on modeling with game theory defense strategies 
against malicious attacks are focused on the following topics: 
• how the government may choose strategy with respect to non-negotiation or 
concession. More specifically, for the kidnap and hijack [29][30].  
• how attackers choose the target country, i.e. with the best payoff expectation, so 
that expected pay-off in one country affects estimated pay-offs in other countries 
[31]. 
• how the government chooses the strategy with respect to deterrence or pre-
emption[32][33]. E.g. Daniel and Arce [34] analyse the effect of those two strategies 
taking interaction between US and Europe in that respect as the playfield. A 
different choice of strategy by one player will influence not only its own benefit 
but also that of the other players. Hence coordination is necessary to coordinate to 
get the best overall strategy. 
 
In general these approaches are focused on strategic choices, namely who will 
be the target, deterrence vs. preemption, negotiation vs. concession, how to bargain 
with terrorists etc. without special consideration for the physical conditions the attack 
shall take place into. As mentioned in 2.1, the existent literature on game theory 
application to terrorist attacks to critical infrastructures lacks in domain specific 
analysis taking into account their peculiar physical features. A model based on mixed 
strategy equilibrium was developed in [4], in which, the power system components 
are ranked with the probabilities of being attacked and defended in terms of the 
probabilities of the attack and defense actions. The payoff sensitivity analysis with 
reference to the defense action and the resource of the both attacker and defender 
sides are performed. Results show an obvious amplifying effect of the power system 
for the malicious attack.  
 
4.2 EXAMPLE OF GAME MODEL FOR RISK ANALYSIS IN MALICIOUS ATTACKS 
 
In this section, considering the specific features of the power system, we 
develop a game model to represent the interaction between the terrorist and the SO 
when attacking/defending the network. 
The goal of the attacker is to maximize the impacts of its attacks: this may be 
roughly measured by the loss of load, in terms of the power in MW that cannot 
anymore be supplied after the attack. The power at different buses of the network can 
be associated to different loads at different locations in the grid. This loss of load 
measures, at the same time, the negative outcome to the defender and the gain for the 
attacker - in this sense the “utilities” that defender and attacker take in the context are 
conflicting. 
This model provides the equilibrium between attacker and defender, in terms of 
the set of discrete probabilities for their attacking and defending actions. 
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Different attack actions will target specific power system components (power 
lines,  substations, ...). Each action has an associated cost to be undertaken, both for 
the attacker and the defender (Tab. 3.2 and 3.3) and  a probability of success.  
The probability of an attack to be successfully implemented (the probability of 
an attack times the probability of success) along with the damages associated to each 
of them provides the risk associated to a possible equilibrium in the interaction among 
the players and allows for a ranking of the system components in terms both of their 
likelihood to be attacked and of the associated risk. That represents the basic for 
designing proper defense plans. 
A sensitivity analysis can be  undertaken in terms of the changes in the  
equilibria and so of the attack patterns for variations in different aspects as the 
constraints in the resources allocated from the attacker and the defender to their 
actions or to the implementation of the defense action devisable. This kind of analysis 
can provide useful information for devising proper defence strategies. 
 
4.2.1 MODEL DESCRIPTION 
 
Due to the fact that the defender and the sufferers share in long term the same 
interest, they both don’t like the terrorist and their goal is to protect the people 
(sufferers) from hurt, the only difference is that the defender owns the forces hence 
more tough, while the sufferers have the right to votes and are more willing to 
compromise with the terrorists when they are attacked. To simplify the game, the  
interaction between the sufferer and the defender is omitted and the sufferer is taken 
as a part of the defender. Due to the fact that the utility of the defender and the 
attacker is completely conflicting, the interaction can be modeled as a zero sum game, 
in which, the loss of one side is the gain of the other side.   
The system vulnerability and the associated risk analysis can be carried out in 
terms of the equilibrium of the game between the defender and attacker. With the 
variation of the system configuration (new line, new bus construction, strengthen of 
the power system components which can be represented by lowering the destroy rate), 
the resources of the defender and the attacker, the equilibrium is accordingly changed 
hence the risk assessment should be performed along with the time. It should be noted 
that defending actions may require long time for their deployment, whereas the 
attacking patterns require less time. For example, the construction of a new line to 
reinforce the system may require from some months to years; instead, a terrorist group 
may suddenly change its attack target.  
The equilibrium is related to a given scenario, characterized by  a certain system 
configuration, attack and defend costs and budget limitation of the palyers; if the 
configuration changes, either because defense measures or attack patterns change, a 
new equilibrium must be found and a new risk analysis has to be carried out. In the 
Fig. 4.2, the temporal representation of the game is depicted, showing that for each 
variation, a new game is established with a new equilibrium. For example, between 
two time points t1 and t2, a defense action has been implemented with a possible 
variation in the attacking patterns. 
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Fig. 4.2 - Risk analysis based on game model along the time axis. 
 
Defender and attacker actions and resources constraints 
 
We consider as possible targets some of the main components of the power 
systems as the transmission lines and the substations. Defense and attack actions 
against/in favor of multiple targets can be conceived and implemented. We define the 
set of desired simultaneous attack actions as: 
 
T = { a1t… akt, …amt  } (4.1) 
 
and the set of simultaneous defense actions as: 
 
F= { a1f, … akf, … anf} (4.2) 
 
The number of actions that both the attacker and the defender can implement depends 
on their costs and is constrained by the resources they have available. Although these 
resources may include non monetary items, they may be reduced to an equivalent 
budget BA, for the attacker and BD, for the defender. The total costs of all the actions 
undertaken by each player need not to exceed the available budget. In formulas: 
CkA=
t
k
a
i
i a
C
∈
∑ ≤ BA             (4.3)   
CkD=
f
k
d
i
i a
C
∈
∑ ≤BD (4.4) 
where: 
CkA cost of the attacker for implementing the attack action akt  
CkD  cost of the defender for implementing the defense action akf 
Cia cost of attacking the component i 
Cid cost of defending the component i 
 
 
Payoff of the players 
 
The payoff of the attacker  SA is: 
 
SA = CD + LD - CA      (4.5) 
 
while the payoff of the defender is: 
 
SD = CA - CD - LD  (4.6) 
 
where CA is  cost of  the attacker to perform an attack action CD is the cost of the 
defender to perform a defence action, LD is the economic value of a loss of load in the 
system and can be expressed as: 
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1
γ
=
= ∆∑n j j
j
L D   (4.7) 
 
where γj is the equivalent economic value of the load at bus j that is reduced due to the 
attack of the amount ∆Dj and n is the number of buses in the network. The load at 
different buses may have different importance from the strategic and economic point 
of view and the  γj coefficient can account for that. 
 
 
Crisis management 
 
Under attack, after one or more components have been destroyed, the system 
may be not feasible and the SO needs to shed loads and change the set-points of the 
generators in order to restore the normal operating condition for the system. The 
transient process is not considered and the related dynamic stability problem 
disregarded and the generators are assumed able to smoothly reduce their power 
output according to the load shedding, i.e. the unbalance of the power supply and 
consumption caused by the lost of lines can be safely removed by generator output 
reduction. 
We represent the strategy adopted by the SO as a constraint optimization 
problem in which the objective is to minimize the equivalent economic value of the 
loss of load D, the equality constraints are the DC power flow equations and the 
inequality constraints are related to the line flow limits and generators’ production 
limits. In formulas: 
1
min
n
j j
j
L Dγ
=
= ∆∑     (4.8) 
s.t. 
 
Bθ=P  (4.9) 
|fl| ≤ Flmax  l=1,2, …, nl   (4.10) 
0≤ ∆Dj≤ Dj  j=1,2,…, n  (4.11) 
0≤ gj +∆gj ≤ Gjmax  j=1,2, …, n  (4.12) 
 
where: 
B  nodal admittance matrix, dim(B) = nxn 
θ   vector of bus angle, dim(θ)=n 
P  vector of bus power injection, dim(P)=n 
∆Dj demand variation at bus j 
Dj  demand at bus j, before the attack 
gj  original generated power at the bus j 
∆gj  original generated power and the generation variation at the node j 
gjmax  original generated power and the generation variation at the node j,. 
fl line flow in line l 
Flmax line flow limit of the line l 
nl number of lines in the network 
 
Equilibrium  search 
 
The payoff of the defender and attacker with reference to k-th scenario 
(defender takes the action i, and attacker takes the action j): 
 
- Attacker : 
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 SAk = CDi-CAj+LDk  (4.13) 
- Defender: 
 SDk = CAj-CDi-LDk  (4.14) 
where: 
SAk:  payoff of the attack in the k-th scenario; 
SDk: payoff of the defender in the k-th scenario; 
CAj:  cost expressed in monetary value of the attacker for implementing attack 
action j; 
CDi:  cost expressed in monetary value to the defender for implementing defense 
action i; 
LDk: loss caused by the power system failure in the k-th scenario, i.e. the effect of 
the attack/defense action. 
 
With the payoffs of the defender and attacker in each scenario computed, the 
game can be solved with a one shot optimization approach based on the mixed 
strategy equilibrium characterization of the uniform expected payoff of the nonzero 
probability actions. The probability assignment to the defender’s/attacker’s actions 
should make uniform the utilities of the attacker’s/defender’s nonzero probability 
actions; moreover, the utility of the nonzero probability actions should be greater than 
that of the zero probability actions. A set of equations with respect to the ‘uniform 
utility’ can be built and the equilibria can be derived. Considering different cases of 
the zero probabilities assignment to the actions, there would be an explosive of the 
case number to be analyzed hence hard to be calculated. 
To solve the problem we transform the discrete cases analysis to a continuous 
optimization problem, which avoid the numerous case studies and conveniently find 
the mixed strategy equilibrium with the optimization algorithm. 
 
Vulnerability ranking of the components 
 
At the equilibrium we get a set of probabilities related to each possible action of 
the attacker and the defender. For the i-th component Oi, the attacking probability is: 
 
t
i k
a A
i k
O a
P p
∀ ∈
= ∑    (4.15) 
 
where akt (O1,... Oi... On) is the k-th action assigned with the probability pkA. 
Once a component i is attacked it can be or cannot be destroyed both in the case 
that it is defended by the defender with some proper actions or not; of course the 
probabilities of disruption are different in the two cases. We define the successful 
destroy probability vector of the attack without the corresponding defense action 
taken: 
α ={ α1, α2, …αnc }   (4.16) 
while with the defense action taken, the successful destroy probability vector of the 
attack is 
β ={ β1, β2, …βnc }   (4.17) 
where nc is the number of the system component that can be attacked. 
 
4.2.2 CASE STUDY AND RESULTS 
We apply, for illustrative purposes, the model introduced in the previous section 
to a 30-bus system to analyze the system security in terms of the interaction between 
the attacker and defender in following aspects: 
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? evaluate the equilibrium with reference to the action of the defender and attacker 
and discover the system vulnerability by the components ranking; 
? analyze the payoff sensitivity to the defense actions, base on which, the reference 
defense plan is designed; 
? analyze the payoff sensitivity to the resource of the defender and attacker, to find 
out how the different resource allocations impact threats from malicious attacks. 
 
Sample system 
 
The sample IEEE 30-bus system consists 41 branches, 20 loads and 6 generators 
system as shown in Fig.4.3. Line data, generation and load data are respectively given 
as Tab. 4.1 and Tab.4.2, The data related to the attack/defense actions and probability 
of successful attack are reported in Tab. 4.3.  
Tab.4.1 - Line set of the IEEE 30-bus system 
Line No. Start bus End bus Admittance Flmax 
1 2 1 0.0575 120 
2 3 1 0.1852 120 
3 4 2 0.1737 120 
4 4 3 0.0379 120 
5 5 2 0.1983 120 
6 6 2 0.1763 120 
7 6 4 0.0414 120 
8 7 5 0.116 120 
9 7 6 0.082 120 
10 8 6 0.042 120 
11 9 6 0.208 120 
12 10 6 0.556 120 
13 11 9 0.208 120 
14 10 9 0.11 120 
15 12 4 0.256 120 
16 13 12 0.14 120 
17 14 12 0.2559 120 
18 15 12 0.1304 120 
19 16 12 0.1987 120 
20 15 14 0.1997 120 
21 17 16 0.1923 120 
22 18 15 0.2185 120 
23 19 18 0.1292 120 
24 20 19 0.068 120 
25 20 10 0.209 120 
26 17 10 0.0845 120 
27 21 10 0.0749 120 
28 22 10 0.1499 120 
29 22 21 0.0236 120 
30 23 15 0.202 120 
31 24 22 0.179 120 
32 24 23 0.27 120 
33 25 24 0.3292 120 
34 26 25 0.38 120 
35 27 25 0.2087 120 
36 27 28 0.396 120 
37 29 27 0.4153 120 
38 30 27 0.6027 120 
39 30 29 0.4533 120 
40 28 8 0.2 120 
41 28 6 0.0599 120 
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Tab.4.2 - Generator and load set of the IEEE 30-bus system 
No. Bus Power  minPower maxPower 
1 1 50 0 100 
2 2 45 0 100 
3 5 45 0 100 
4 8 45 0 100 
5 11 45 0 100 
6 13 31.7 0 100 
3 3 -2.4 -2.4 0 
4 4 -7.6 -7.6 0 
5 5 -94.2 -94.2 0 
6 6 0 0 0 
7 7 -22.8 -22.8 0 
8 8 -30 -30 0 
9 9 0 0 0 
10 10 -5.8 -5.8 0 
11 11 0 0 0 
12 12 -11.2 -11.2 0 
13 13 0 0 0 
14 14 -6.2 -6.2 0 
15 15 -8.2 -8.2 0 
16 16 -3.5 -3.5 0 
17 17 -9 -9 0 
18 18 -3.2 -3.2 0 
19 19 -9.5 -9.5 0 
20 20 -2.2 -2.2 0 
21 21 -17.5 -17.5 0 
22 22 0 0 0 
23 23 -3.2 -3.2 0 
24 24 -8.7 -8.7 0 
25 25 0 0 0 
26 26 -3.5 -3.5 0 
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Fig.4.3 -  IEEE 30 bus system 
Input of the defense/attack actions 
 
The attack and defence cost of the lines and nodes are shown in Tab.4.3. The 
successful destroyed rate with/without protection of the power system component are 
respectively βi =0.2 and αi=0,8; the load shedding evaluation factor γj=10. 
Tab 4.3 – Budget data of attack and defense * 
Budget 60 
Attack single line cost 26 Attacker 
Attack single bus cost 60 
Budget 50 
Defend single line cost 20 Defender 
Defend single bus cost 50 
Equilibrium 
 
In the game, each of the two sides will evaluate their strategies based on the 
action of their counterpart. The attack and the defense actions are viewed as a 
potential move for the specific context, which is defined by the configuration of the 
power system and the budget of the players. The equilibrium of the game in the base 
case is described in Tab.4.4, in which, at the equilibrium the attacker will attack the 
buses 1 and 2 with the probability 0.8826 and 0.1174 respectively, and as the 
countermeasure to fix the equilibrium, the defender will defend lines 35 and 33 with 
the probability 0.9995 and 0.0005.  The defender is not going to defend the buses 1 
and 2, although they are more likely to be attacked, because the equilibrium is the 
outcome of the interaction, if the defender doesn’t take the action defined at the 
equilibrium, for instance to defend buses 1 and 2 instead of lines 33 and 35, the 
attacker will also change his mind, namely buses 1 and 2 will possibly not be the 
target of the attacker as well. The expected payoff can be considered as a metric to 
                                                 
*value are in arbitrary monetary unit 
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provide an overall index for describing the security level of the malicious attack. The 
expected payoff of the attacker is 1253.6, which is defined by the probability of the 
actions taken and the corresponding payoff taking into account the cost of the actions 
and the loss of load. Moreover, as a result of the zero sum game representation, the 
expected payoff of the defender is the negative payoff of the attacker. 
Tab.4.4 - Mixed strategy equilibrium at the original state 
1 0.8826 Bus 2 0.1174 Attack probability Line - - Attacker 
Expected Payoff 1253.6 
Bus - - 
35 0.9995 Defense probability Line 33 0.0005 Defender 
Expected Payoff -1253.6 
 
Payoff sensitivity to the defense action 
After the base case is obtained, in term of equilibrium with a givens set of 
defense and attack actions, the information obtained can be exploited, by the defender, 
to implement defense action that would lead to a new state. Tab.4.4, Tab.4.5, Tab.4.6 
Tab.4.7 report under each state, the probability distributions of being attacked and 
defended to the components along with the corresponding payoffs. 
From the Tab. 4.4, Tab. 4.5, Tab. 4.6 and Tab. 4.7, we see that with the non-
zero probability defense action implemented, the equilibrium will be changed, and the 
distribution of the probabilities of the attack and defense will be re-allocated. The 
results shows numerically that  the more defense action are taken, the more the attacks 
distribution is disperse,. The probabilities of the various attack and defence actions  at 
the equilibrium provide an assessment of which  component will be more likely to be  
attacked or defended. 
Tab.4.5 -  Mixed strategy equilibrium with lines 35 and 33 defended 
1 0.2999 Bus 2 0.2999 
5 0.4002 
Attack 
probability Line 9 0.4002 
Attacker 
PayOff 856.8 
1 0.4386 Bus 2 0.4386 
5 0.1228 
Defense 
probability Line 9 0.1228 
Defender 
PayOff -856.8 
Tab.4.6 -  Mixed strategy equilibrium with lines 5 and 9, buses 1 and  2  defended 
Bus 5 0.1017 
8 0.2566 
33 0.2566 
36 0.2566 
37 0.2566 
38 0.2566 
39 0.2566 
Attack 
probability Line 
41 0.2566 
Attacker 
PayOff 548.41 
Bus 5 0.3336 
8 0.1904 
Defender Defense  
probability Line 
33 0.1904 
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36 0.1904 
37 0.1904 
38 0.1904 
39 0.1904 
41 0.1904 
PayOff -548.41 
 
Tab.4.7 - Mixed strategy equilibrium with bus 5, lines 8, 33,36,37,38,39 and 41 
defended 
Bus - - 
1 0.0965 
2 0.0481 
4 0.0484 
15 0.2701 
26 0.1918 
29 0.2701 
30 0.2675 
31 0.2679 
32 0.2695 
Attack 
probability Line 
40 0.2701 
Attacker 
PayOff 568.43 
Bus - - 
1 1 
2 0.1904 
Defense  
probability Line 
4 0.1904 
Defender 
PayOff -568.43 
 
The payoff variation with different defense actions implemented is shown in 
Fig.4.4. From the defender point of view, the payoff increases fast at the beginning 
when defense actions are taken; it reaches a maximum value at the third action, After 
that, the defender’s  payoff actually decreases, if additional defense actions are taken.  
In this example, to defend lines 33, 35, 5, 9 and buses 1 and 2 is the optimal action for 
the defender willing to maximize its payoff. 
 
Fig.4.4 - Payoff variation with the defense actions implementation  
 
Payoff sensitivity to the resources allocated by  the players 
The payoff variation with respect to the variation of the budgets of the defender 
and attacker is reported in Fig. 4.5. 
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Fig.4.5 - Payoff sensitivity to the variation of the budget of defender and attacker 
 
The variation of the budget of both the defender and attacker will surely impact the 
result of the interaction between the attacker and defender. This is because the defense 
and attack action sets are determined by the corresponding budgets allocations. In Fig. 
4.5 we see that, when the budget of the attacker increases from 30 to 60, the payoff of 
the attacker increases rapidly showing the amplifier effect of the infrastructure. On the 
contrary, an increase of the defense budget (e.g. from 25 to 60) is much less effective 
to curb the attack effects. In other words, the payoff of the attacker is very sensitive to 
the budget of the attacker, but much less sensitive to the budget of the defender. This 
implies that the defender must allocate much more resources in order to be sure to 
achieve some significant impact  of  the  defense measures deployed. 
 
  29
5. MODELING OF COORDINATION/COOPERATION UNDER MALICIOUS 
ATTACKS WITH MAS 
 
5.1 MAS APPLICATION TO COORDINATION/COOPERATION MODELING  
Artificial Intelligence (AI) methods are used to tackle complex, realistic, and 
large-scale problems. One such method which found successful recent application in 
complex problem solving is the multi-agent approach. This section explores in which 
way this method may be applied to modeling malicious attacks to critical 
infrastructures. 
 
5.1.1 DEFINITIONS 
 
An agent is an abstract or physical autonomous entity which performs a given 
task using information gleaned from its environment to act in a suitable manner so as 
to complete the task successfully. The agent should be able to adapt itself based on 
changes occurring in its environment, so that a change in circumstances will still yield 
the intended result. 
An agent is rational if it always selects an action that optimizes an appropriate 
performance measure, given what the agent knows so far. The performance measure 
is typically defined by the user (the designer of the agent) and reflects what the user 
expects from the agent in the task at hand. A rational agent is also called an intelligent 
agent.[35] 
The thing an agent interacts with, comprising everything outside the agent, is 
called the environment. The collective information that is contained in the 
environment at any time step t , and that is relevant for the task at hand, will be called 
a state of the environment. 
Assume that an agent interacts with its environment at each of a sequence of 
discrete time points ntttt ,...,, 10= . Let },...,3,2,1{ nssssS = be the finite set of possible 
states of the environment and  },...,3,2,1{ maaaaA =  be the finite set of admissible 
actions the agent can take. At each time step t , the agent senses the current state 
Ssts ∈=  of its environment and on that basis selects an action Aata ∈= . As a result 
of its action, the agent receives an immediate reward 1+tr , and the environment’s state 
changes to the new state Ssts ∈′=+1 . 
 
 
Fig.5.1-Agent’s interaction with the environment 
 
A Multi-agent system is composed of a group of autonomous agents. Each agent 
has its own local view of the world and its own goals. The agent will adjust its 
behavior based on a heuristic learning algorithm so as to obtain a realistic outcome of 
the system. The main difference between the Game Theory and the Multi-agent 
approach is that Game Theory algorithms assume that the transition and reward 
Agent 
action 
  ta  
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reward 
tr  
state 
ts  
1+ts
1+tr
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function is known, while Reinforcement Learning algorithms used in the Multi-agent 
approach only receive observations about the transition and reward function and learn 
by experience.[35] 
Reinforcement learning (RL) is a generic name given to a family of techniques 
in which an agent tries to learn a task by directly interacting with the environment. RL 
techniques may be successfully applied to finding optimal control policies for a single 
agent operating in a stationary environment, specifically in the frame of a Markovian 
decision process (the current state provides a complete description of the history 
before and the distribution of future states only depends on the current state but not 
any past states). Agents are required to act in the environment in order to gain 
observations about transitions and rewards. The field of single-agent RL is nowadays 
mature, with well-understood theoretical results and many practical techniques.[36] On 
the contrary, the field of multi-agent reinforcement learning in which many agents are 
simultaneously learning by interacting with the environment and with each other, is 
less mature. The main reason is that many theoretical results for single-agent RL do 
not directly apply in the case of multiple agents.[35] 
There are various reinforcement learning algorithms as Q-Learning, Opponent 
Modeling Q-Learning, Actor-Critic, Gradient descent, Win or Learn Fast (WoLF), 
which can be used for the agent to make response to the change of the environment. 
In Q-Learning, a table of values is updated while playing a stochastic game. This Q-
table can be used to choose actions that will maximize expected discounted rewards. 
[36] The Opponent Modeling Q-Learning method is based on the Q-Learning method 
and records the probability distribution of opponent actions in each state by observing 
the actions of the other player. In actor-critic systems, there are two components to the 
reinforcement-learning system, the critic learns values, and the actor learns policies. 
At any given time, the critic is learning the values for the Markov chain that comes 
from following the current policy of the actor. The actor is constantly learning the 
policy that is greedy with the respect to the critic's current values. Gradient descent is 
an optimization algorithm. To find a local minimum of a function using gradient 
descent, one takes steps proportional to the negative of the gradient (or the 
approximate gradient) of the function at the current point. If instead one takes steps 
proportional to the gradient, one approaches a local maximum of that function. In our 
model, the independent learning method has been implemented because it realizes a 
good compromise between computational efforts and accuracy of results. 
Different criteria for decision making may be suitable for different scenarios; in 
our model we have chosen the widely used criterion based on the choice of the 
maxium Q-value for each agent in the independent learning scenario. Moreover there 
are also various criteria for decision making such as Minimax-Q, Nash-Q, Friend or 
Foe, CE-Q etc. For zero-sum stochastic games, Minimax-Q is based on  updating the 
utility values by the minimax of Q values so that an agent can maximize private utility 
based on minimizing the utility of the opponent. Nash-Q updates the utility values 
based on some Nash equilibrium in the game defined by the Q-values. For Friend or 
Foe, it is more informative to view FoF as two algorithms, each applying in a 
different special class of stochastic games. The Friend class consists of stochastic 
games in which, throughout the execution of the algorithm, the Q-values of the 
players define a game in which there is a globally optimal action profile. The Foe 
class is the one in which the Q-values define a game with a saddle point. CE-Q is 
similar to Nash-Q, but instead uses the value of a correlated equilibrium to update the 
utility values. 
 
5.1.2 MODELING A CONFLICT FRAMEWORK WITH MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS 
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The Multi-agent approach allows to model effectively conflict contexts . Agents 
behave in a bounded rational manner. They learn from the environment and by 
experience so as to find the best strategy option for each agent. Therefore in our case, 
each agent in the system will judge the situation based on the environment with 
particular attention to its experience: 
• Attacker Agent (e.g. terrorists) will evaluate the effect of its attacks based on the 
records (success or failure with respect to a specific attack target, the influence on 
economy or psychology of common people or the achievement of their political 
purpose) so as to decide upon the next move. A model about the decision strategy and 
the knowledge of the opponent, especially for defender, would make the simulation 
more realistic. 
• Defender agent (e.g. the government and relevant entities) will on one hand check 
the past behavior of the attackers and on the other hand evaluate the environment 
where potential attacks may be deployed against specific targets. A model about the 
decision strategy of the attacker based on its knowledge or information would be 
helpful for better decision.  
• Sufferer agent – who suffers direct consequences of attacks – may react by 
evaluating the impact of behavioural changes with reference to a specific 
infrastructure reacting to a specific attack (e.g. by  changing to another transport 
system, less water consumption…) and in terms of pressure/support to the 
government. The reaction of the sufferer would be transformed as rewards for both 
the attackers  and the defenders in some way  to influence their decisions; however 
this agent may not take part in the struggle about the infrastructure directly. 
As shown in Fig.5.2, the infrastructures are represented by the gray octagon in 
which the vertices represent different potential attacking targets. The defender agent 
decides the defending strategy which is represented by the green circle in broken lines 
based on rational decision. The attacker agent makes decision about which targets and 
how to attack based on rational decision. Although the attacker may only choose to 
attack some specific points as represented by the red vertices, this attack may 
influence the function of the whole infrastructure. Then the suffer agent will be 
injured by not only the targets attacked but also the other targets as shown by the grey 
arrows from all vertices to the suffer agent. In this way, the attacking effect is 
amplified. Attackers and defenders influence the sufferer agent(s) through the 
infrastructures. Then the sufferer agent will make feedback which is represented by 
the blue arrows to the attacker agent and the defender agent to influence their future 
decisions.  
In that interplay, a specifically constrained network such as a power system, a 
water supply system, etc., will be evaluated for the weak points to have the highest 
possibility to be attacked according to the actual situation and system records, which 
can be modeled as the environment of all agents and then the transition and reward 
analysis will be carried out to predict the next step. 
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Fig.5.2 - Interaction within the agents involved in terrorism attack 
 
5.1.3 MULTI-AGENT REPRESENTATION FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND 
INFORMATION IMPACT ANALYSIS 
 
Different situations and aspects can be captured resorting to MAS. Two 
particularly important aspects are the related coordination processes among various 
entities and the impacts of the availability of information under emergency conditions.  
The growing complexity of the network structure, the restructuring and 
deregulating of power systems all make it unreasonable to keep considering the 
defender of power systems as a single united entity. Inappropriate interactions among 
all stakeholders in the defending process will magnify the influence of attacks and 
become a new source of vulnerability. So the coordination of different System 
Operators (SOs)  in an interconnected power system is an important issue in defense 
against malicious attacks.  
When analysing power system security against malicious attacks, the attention 
should not only focus on the interactions between the defenders and attackers, but also 
on the coordination among the stakeholders of the defender. At the same time, the 
effect of coordination depends seriously on the availability of different information. 
According to the UCTE operation handbook[38], during emergency situations there 
should be exchange of information between SOs about systems’ conditions next to the 
borders: topology, weak points in the network and potential risk of operation. Each 
SO has to make available real-time information about relevant parts of  its own 
system  to other neighbouring SOs. So the communication is very important for the 
relevant control entities to achieve successful joint control target. 
To have a clear insight of this problem, we should divide a power system into 
two tightly interconnected layers, the physical layer and the operating management 
one. The management layer can be further sub-divided into a coordination sub-layer 
Infrastructure 
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and an information sub-layer. The relationship between all these layers is shown in 
Fig.5.3. 
 
 
Fig.5.3-Physical/Management  layers interactions 
 
All the relevant control entities, that are the entities in charge for each SO to 
operate the system,  pertain to the operating management layer. Each of them may 
have a special role in the control mechanism and can only influence limited part of the 
physical layer. The physical layer is composed by the system lines and buses on 
which the power actually flows. The control entities will implement their control 
actions on the physical layers, as a reaction to malicious attacks, resorting to the 
information they get from the information sub-layer. 
 
 
Coordination schemes under emergency conditions 
 
As rationality is an important feature of an agent, it is reasonable to resort to 
multiple agents to represent different control entities in the management layer with 
their own role, target and interest. In this way, we can simulate the mechanism of 
coordination between control entities and its influence on the control results by the 
coordination between agents and the output state of the environment. 
In multi-agent system, there is still no universally best coordination mechanism 
[39]. Each coordination mechanism should be selected according to the characteristics 
of the tasks in hand.[39] In coordination of interconnected power systems, the SOs 
have equal positions with no priorities to make decision and there is no direct central 
decision making for them. Each SO is a self-interest entity but also has motivation to 
help other peers. The time scale of control under emergent situation is short. All these 
characteristics make some mechanisms with central decision, unequal priorities [40] or 
long or medium term planning [41][42] not appropriate to this problem. 
SOs are rational agents. They act on their own interest with a cooperative 
attitude, because their own system security depends on the others. The security of the 
whole interconnected power system is beneficial for each subsystem, so all SOs are 
willing to be cooperative to some extent. But at the same time, every SO cares more 
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for its own system security and would not like to be much constrained by 
collaboration rules and procedures. These problem features call for a methodology 
able to reconcile self-interest with cooperation. This can be achieved by an 
appropriate balance between cooperation and self-interest in the design of  rational 
agents performance measure. 
 
Information impacts under emergency conditions 
 
Information plays a key role under emergency condition since, especially under 
emergency,  the decision assumed relays on the data available and their completeness. 
However as the configuration of the control entities in power system and the actual 
management mechanisms are very complex, the communication mechanism and 
relevant information depend on different roles of different entities and their 
relationships. Control  layers, their relationship, and the relevant information flows 
among them can be schematically represent as  follows (fig 5.4) 
 
 
 
Fig.5.4-Configuration of entities and their communication  
 
In Fig.5.4, as an example, we may divide the control entities into three levels 
that may be more suitable for representing the situation in Europe. The first national 
level is related to the entities representing the systems of different countries. Under it, 
the second level is for the different TSOs operating under the national level. The third 
level may be for the companies distributed in the network managed by the TSO. The 
communication among different entities is represented by broken lines. Allthese 
entities take operational decisions on the physical power system based on their own 
analysis of the information they can get. And the output state of the power system 
results from the joint operations of these entities. 
In multi-agents system, each agent can only perceive limited information about 
the environment. To achieve better cooperation, they also need communication for 
more information about the environment. So still using multiple agents to represent 
the entities at different levels, we can simulate the communication between different 
entities as the communication between agents. But as the location and role of the 
entities are different, the corresponding agents may have different structure, target and 
interest. That makes meaningful to simulate which information may be critical for 
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some potential malicious attacks or what would be the consequence if some 
communication is disabled by malicious attacks analyzing different scenarios. 
5.2 EXAMPLE OF MAS MODEL FOR INFORMATION IMPACTS IN COORDINATION 
The model deals with a set of SOs running different interconnected power 
systems; the systems are interconnected via tie-lines and the malicious attack may 
target to those lines and/or to lines that are internal to the systems. Each SO has full 
control on the generation and loads in its own system; it can get the measures on the 
state (line power flows) on its system and, eventually, get also information about 
some of the states of the neighbor systems. Different levels of information about the 
state may be available to different operators at different time points both due to 
specific policy decisions, related to the international agreements (bilateral, or by the 
UCTE, the NORDEL and international TSOs associations alike), and to monitoring 
equipment failures due both to accidental faults and deliberate manipulation (e.g. via 
cyber attacks). Under malicious attacks each operator may chose different behaviors, 
according to its utility and based on available information and the internationally 
agreed rules of behaviour ; it may focus just on its system trying to maximizing a 
measure of the its system welfare (“individual behavior”) or may want to contribute to 
the welfare of the all interconnected system, including all the grids of the other 
operators (“social behavior”). In the first case the reaction under attacks will be 
characterized by a lack of coordination while in the second case we have full 
coordination; of course different levels of coordination within these two extremes are 
possible. The proposed model aims to study the outcomes of difference choices in 
terms of coordination under various scenarios characterized by different levels of 
information available. 
 
5.2.1 INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL RATIONALITY 
 
The different attitudes in terms of attention to the welfare of the overall system - 
or only to their own system specific welfare - can be modeled resorting to the notion 
of individual and social agent [43].An individually rational agent is an agent who 
focuses only on its own (individual) utility when deciding which action to perform. A 
socially rational agent is an agent who also considers the utility of other agents in 
deciding which action to perform.  
We will use the notion of expected utility of actions in deriving a more 
descriptive notion of choice within a multi-agent environment. From the 
aforementioned principle of social rationality, to calculate the expected utility (UEi) of 
an action α implemented by agent i, the agent needs to combine (using some function 
f) the individual utility (UIi) afforded to itself which performs α and the social utility 
(USi) afforded to the overall system when α is executed[43]:  
  
))(),(()( ααα SiIiEi UUfU =                                                                                           
(5.1) 
 
The individual utility is a measure of the welfare of the agent (operator) related 
to its systems while its social utility is a measure of the welfare of the global system 
that it is willing to consider. The social utility is based on different “social 
relationships”, in terms of power exchange with the other SOs, in which the agent is 
engaged. 
Let the set of social relationships in which a particular agent (i) is engaged be 
denoted by the vector λi = [λ1i, λ2i,...., λni]. To each relationship  we associate  a vector 
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of coefficient ϕi = [ϕ1i, ϕ2i,...,ϕni]  with 0 ≤ϕij ≤ 1 and ∑
=
n
j 1
ϕij =1 that weight the 
importance of each of these relationships. And USj(α) is the “social relationship 
utility” which is the utility afforded to the agent in λij by the execution of α. 
Function f  in (5.1) can be written as:[43]  
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where k1 and k2, with k1+k2=1, are two coefficients devoted to weight the individual 
and social utilities on the expected utility of an action α . 
 
5.2.2 MAS MODEL FOR COORDINATION UNDER VARIOUS INFORMATION SCENARIOS 
 
In the following paragraphs, we will introduce the MAS model in terms of 
different main aspects to have a clearer insight for the configuration of the model. In 
this way, the mechanism of the simulation can be understood easily. 
 
 
Overall System Structure 
 
The system is composed by n different subsystems ( nSSS ,,, 21 L  ) 
interconnected by tie-lines with each other. We define n different agents to represent 
the operators of each subsystem.  
Each agent will: 
• Sense information from  its local system to simulate the real situation that 
each OS can only collect information of local system directly; 
• Determine what action to perform on its local system, based on its utility 
function.  
 
System States 
 
The controlling process of multi-agent system can be considered as a transition  
process. Each agent distinguishes and judges the state according to its own 
perceptions and implement actions to transit to the desired state. 
There are some traditional and classic methods to classify the power system 
states [44]. But in this model, according to the point of view of agents and the control 
process, we simply consider: 
 
• Secure states: when no line is overloaded. 
• Emergency states: when at least one line is overloaded after an attack. 
 
The states transition is shown in Fig.5.5. The control process of agents in this 
model is to move the  state of the system from Emergency to Secure. Both Secure and 
Emergency states are composed of different operative configurations characterized by 
different power flows, generation and load distributions. 
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Fig.5.5-States Transition 
Action Set 
To remove the security contingency, we assume that all the operating agents can 
only select to shed loads at the buses of their own territory. Since at different 
operative configuration, the distributions of loads at all buses are different, the 
available actions at different configurations are different. 
We assume that the set of control actions is discrete according to the nature of 
some of them and to the possibility to make the other discrete as well.  In the local 
subsystem, if there are m buses whose loads are possible to be shed, we define a 
vector A named as action scheme which consists of m elements. Each element has two 
possible values 0 (load on this bus is not to be shed) or 1 (load on this bus is to be 
shed). For example A = {1,0,0,…,0} means that only the load on bus 1 is to be shed. 
 
Attacking Pattern 
We just consider attacking patterns consisting of cutting off some tie-lines or 
internal transmission lines. Qne attacking pattern may include several attacked lines. . 
Since our research purpose is the coordination under malicious attacks, the attacking 
pattern is fixed when to make simulation of coordination. 
 
Learning Method 
We assume the attacking pattern is fixed and at the beginning of every time step 
the system is in one of the Secure operative configurations. After the fixed attack 
happens, the system would be transferred to one Emergency operative configuration. 
Each agent will try to control the system back to some Secure operative configuration, 
by choosing an action scheme to implement. No matter if the operative configuration 
of the system has been moved to Secure, at the end of this time step or not, the agent 
will receive a reward, that is a measure of the utility got from its action, as the effect 
for its action. In the next time step, this process will be repeated.  
Although there is no direct interference in the coordination of interconnected 
power system, some coordinating organization (such as UCTE) would make some 
coordinating rules which can restrict the selections of agents. Whatever the contents 
of the rules are, the final effects should be the restriction on selection of actions. Some 
combinations of actions are forbidden according to the rules in some specific 
situations. 
We assume that j is the combination of actions which is composed of n different 
actions by n agents ( nααα L21 ). J is the set of all possible combinations. J+ is the 
set that approved by the rules and J- is the set that forbidden by the rules. 
According to this, we apply the classic Q-learning method to independent 
learning with constraints J+. For each agent i , the learning formula is: 
 
Emergency Secure 
Successful Control 
Process 
Successful 
Terrorism Attacks Unsuccessful 
Terrorism Attacks Unsuccessful Control Process 
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(5.3) 
where i = 1,2,…,n and  j = ( nααα L21 )∈ J+  
In the classic Q-learning theory, the learning rate β  must fulfill some 
conditions to guarantee its convergence [45]. But this is based on the single agent 
scenario where the state transition probability and reward probability are deterministic 
by states of environment and its actions. But in multi-agent independent learning, the 
other agents included in the environment are also learning and adjusting their 
decisions which make the environment not deterministic. The convergence of the 
learning process depends on that the learning process of other agents would settle 
down [37]. So we fix β  as 0.9 based on our empirical simulations.[46] 
 
Initial values and dynamic exploration 
When multiple equiibria exist, the selection of equilibrium is always a boring 
problem for multi-agent reinforcement learning. Here we refer to the initial values, 
dynamic exploring rate and constraints by J+ to improve the situation in our 
independent learning model. 
The agents use greedy action selection with an exploring rate to explore other 
actions. The initial values are the starting evaluations of all potential actions to be 
exploited. The less the exploring rate is, the more the learning process will follow the 
direction of initial values. So the initial values can be considered as the sequence of 
wills about which load to be shed when the operator has no further knowledge about 
the physical situation in the networks. When the exploring rate begins from zero and 
increases slowly, the learning result may be a feasible action scheme which is much 
“closer” to the initial wills. 
In this model, we assign initial values to different action schemes according to 
their quantity of loads to be shed as the initial wills of operators when they have no 
further knowledge about the physical behaviors of the system. The less quantity of 
loads to be shed an action scheme has, the higher value it would be assigned. The 
exploring rate begins from zero and increases to an up limit 0.2. 
To assure that the learning process stops at a real equilibrium; we take use of 
multiple convergences. Every time when all Q-values converge, these Q-values will 
be considered as initial values and the learning process restarts again until the two 
consecutive convergences of Q-values bring to the same decisions in terms of action 
schemes. 
 
Utilities 
To reflect the security situation of the model system, we use overload rate of 
lines to calculate the utilities of each agent for their actions. L  is the set of all lines. 
For one line l of L, if its active power flow is Pl and maximum power flow limit is 
Plmax, then the utility for this line is : 
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U                                                                                             
(5.4) 
 
It should be emphasized that the utility is negative when the line is over loaded, 
so the purpose of the agents is to maximize this utility as coherent with the normal 
learning situation for agents. 
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If Ii is the set of internal lines whose both terminal buses are all in the local 
territory for agent i, Ti is the set of tie-lines for agent i whose one terminal bus is in 
the local territory and the other is in another territory. Then the individual utility for 
agent i is: 
∑∑
∈∈
+=
ii Tl
l
Il
lI
i UUU 5.0                       (5.5) 
As discussed, an individually rational agent would only focus on the utility of 
its actions for itself, while a socially rational agent would consider both the utility for 
itself and the utility for other agents from its actions. Hence, for socially rational 
agents, the calculation of expected utility can be expressed as: 
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Where EiU  is the expected utility for agent i   , 1k  is the weight at which agent i 
considers its own utility, 2k  is the weight at which agent i considers the utilities of its 
social relationship. 121 =+ kk . inii ϕϕϕ ,,, 21 L  are the weights which shows how much 
agent i considers all other agents should occupy in its social relationship. 1
1
=∑
=
n
k
i
kϕ . If 
agent  n  has no social relationship with agent  i, then 0=inϕ . 
The evaluation of ϕ  depends on how tight the interaction between the two 
agents is in the current time step. We use the absolute value of power exchange 
between the two parts as the parameter to evaluate the interaction. If the interaction 
between agent i and another agent is more active, then agent i would like to consider 
the overload rate of this agent more important. If )1( nkPik L=  is the absolute value 
of active power flow exchanged at tie-lines between agent i and agent k, then 
calculations of in
ii ϕϕϕ ,,, 21 L  can be expressed as: 
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Then the calculation of reward for a socially rational agent is: 
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But the calculation of reward for an individually rational agent can be expressed as: 
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Mi is a constant which is the maximum quantity of loads to be shed in each of 
all possible action schemes in the subsystem of SO i. Li is the sum of loads shed by 
SO i in its subsystem in the implemented action scheme. 
 
Information Scenarios 
 
Different levels of information available would influence the effect of 
coordination. In our model, the calculation of utilities is based on the information of 
active power of transmission lines. For different scenarios of information available, 
the calculating results would depend on how much information about neighbors each 
agent can get.  
In this model, we just consider two extreme scenarios: 
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• Full information: information about active power of all transmission lines of 
neighbors is available. This scenario is simulated by socially rational agents. 
• No information: no information about active power of transmission lines of 
neighbors is available. This scenario is simulated by individually rational 
agents. 
 
5.2.3 CASE STUDY AND RESULTS 
We apply, for illustrative purpose, the model introduced in the previous section 
to a 34-bus system to analyze the coordination of SOs in different information 
scenarios to the aim of : 
? analyzing the effect of the coordination by socially rational agents as a method 
to make balance between cooperative behaviors and self-interested behaviors; 
? analyzing the impact of information from the results of two different 
information scenarios; 
? analyzing the different information sensitivity of operative configurations to 
indicate their different dependencies for information. 
 
Sample system 
 
The sample 34-bus system is composed of three interconnected subsystems 
shown in figure 5.6. In this system, three different subsystems are controlled by three 
different SOs (SO1, SO2 and SO3). Line data, generation and load data are 
respectively given as Tab. 5.1 and Tab.5.2. 
 
Fig.5.6-Structure of Sample System 
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Tab.5.1 – Line data 
 
Line NO. Start bus End bus Admittance[p.u.] Plmax[p.u.] 
1 1 2 0.05062 2.286 
2 1 3 0.05785 3.0 
3 1 4 0.05785 2.286 
4 1 4 0.08161 2.286 
5 1 8 0.12934 2.286 
6 1 10 0.00413 2.477 
7 1 10 0.00413 2.477 
8 2 4 0.05062 2.286 
9 2 11 0.00413 2.286 
10 3 4 0.13843 2.286 
11 3 5 0.20041 2.286 
12 3 12 0.00413 2.286 
13 3 12 0.00413 2.286 
14 4 15 0.05114 2.286 
15 4 7 0.06818 2.286 
16 4 13 0.00413 2.286 
17 4 13 0.00413 2.286 
18 5 15 0.0657 2.477 
19 5 14 0.00413 2.286 
20 6 15 0.00413 2.286 
21 6 15 0.00413 2.286 
22 7 8 0.06674 2.286 
23 7 16 0.00413 2.286 
24 8 17 0.00413 2.286 
25 9 14 0.08161 2.286 
26 30 29 0.04756 1.039 
27 30 29 0.04756 1.039 
28 30 29 0.04756 1.039 
29 32 30 0.04756 1.039 
30 32 30 0.04756 1.039 
31 32 31 0.04756 1.039 
32 32 31 0.04756 1.039 
33 34 33 0.092 1.039 
34 33 32 0.092 1.039 
35 24 25 0.04756 1.039 
36 26 25 0.04756 1.039 
37 27 26 0.04756 1.039 
38 28 27 0.04756 1.039 
39 19 20 0.04756 1.039 
40 19 20 0.04756 1.039 
41 21 20 0.04756 1.039 
42 21 20 0.04756 1.039 
43 21 22 0.092 1.039 
44 18 21 0.04756 1.039 
45 18 21 0.04756 1.039 
46 22 23 0.092 1.039 
47 29 12 0.01033 3.811 
48 31 14 0.01033 2.286 
49 34 9 0.02066 2.286 
50 24 16 0.02066 2.477 
51 28 6 0.02066 2.477 
52 19 17 0.01033 3.429 
53 18 11 0.01033 2.286 
54 23 13 0.04132 2.286 
 
 
Tab.5.2 - Distribution of generations and loads 
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 Operative Configuration 1 Operative Configuration 2 
Bus NO. Generation [p.u.] Load [p.u.] Generation [p.u.] Load [p.u.] 
1 0 0 0 0 
2 1.8 0 1.8 0 
3 0 1 0 1 
4 0 3.8 0 3.8 
5 0 1.8 0 1.8 
6 2.4 0 0 0.7 
7 0 0 0 0.4 
8 0 0 0 0 
9 2 0 3.4 0 
10 3.4 0 3.4 0 
11 0 0 0 0 
12 0 0 0 0 
13 4 0 4 0 
14 0 0 0 0 
15 0 0 0 1.0 
16 0 0 0 0 
17 0 0 0 0 
18 0 0.9 0 0.9 
19 1.15 0 1.15 0 
20 0 1.75 0 1.75 
21 2.7 0 2.7 0 
22 0 0.6 0 0.6 
23 0 0.6 0 0.6 
24 0 0.5 0 0.5 
25 0 0.5 0 0.5 
26 0 0.5 0 0.5 
27 0 0.5 0 0.5 
28 0 0 0 0 
29 0 0.9 0 0.5 
30 0 0.95 0 0.55 
31 0 0.9 0 0.5 
32 0 1.05 0 0.05 
33 0 0.6 0 0 
34 0 0.6 0 0.3 
Input of the model: 
 
We fix the attacking pattern as cutting off two lines between bus1 and bus3 and 
between bus5 and bus 14. 
For simplification of computation, here we only consider two operative 
configurations in Emergency which have two corresponding operative configurations 
associated via the fixed attacking pattern in Secure. The power exchange, in p.u., 
among all these three parts at the two different operative configurations has been 
displayed as Fig.5.7. 
  43
           
 
Fig.5.7-Power exchange at different operative configurations (values are expressed in p.u.) 
 
In the learning process, each operative configuration has a fifty percent 
probability at the beginning of each time step.  
We assume that each agent may shed the loads of one or two buses under its 
control in one action scheme. At different operative configurations, the distributions 
of loads at all buses are different, so the available action schemes at different 
operative configurations are different. The values of M1 M2 and M3 are assigned 
according to the loads distribution and the rule expressed in last section. We set k1 and 
k2 in formula (5.6) as k1= k2=0.5 which means attitude of medium extent about 
individual interest and social interest. 
According to the UCTE operation handbook, to require cooperation of other 
operators to relieve the congestions in its own subsystem, an operator should have 
devoted all possible internal resources and failed. So we assume such a coordinating 
rule that after the learning process by individually rational agents, if one agent fails to 
relieve its own congestions, its action should have been fixed as the one shedding the 
maximum possible loads in its subsystem during the learning process by socially 
rational agents. This can be considered as a constraint J+. 
 
Effects of the coordination 
 
For operative configuration 1, the individually rational agents and socially 
rational agents can get the same action result which is successful to remove all 
congestions of the interconnected power system (as shown in Tab.5.3). 
Tab.5.3 - Results for operative configuration1 
 
 
Scenario of no information 
(Individually rational agents) 
Scenario of full information 
(Socially rational agents) 
 
SO1 SO2 SO3 SO1 SO2 SO3 
Bus of shed loads None 33 34 
None None 33 
34 
None 
Quantity of shed loads [p.u.] 0 1.2 0 0 1.2 0 
Over loaded rate of subsystem 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SO1 SO2 
SO3 
SO1 SO2 
SO3 
 Configuration 1  Configuration 2 
3.66 
    1.74 2.14 
1.83 
    3.57 0.53 
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For operative configuration 2, individually rational agents fail to remove 
congestions, while socially rational agents can successfully remove all congestions (as 
shown in Tab.5.4). 
 
Tab.5.4 - Results for operative configuration 2 
 
 
 
 
 
These two scenarios (configuration 1 and 2) show the effect of coordination on 
the control results. With full information available, a set of socially rational multi-
agents achieve effective coordination in reaction to malicious attacks. They come to 
an effective balance in between operative behaviors and self-interested behaviors. 
This result coincides with the characteristics of interconnected power systems where 
SOs both have to make contributions to overall system security and also try to 
maintain their individual interests. 
 
Impact of information 
 
For the two different information scenarios, from the different results of 
operative configuration 2 we can see that the availability of information about other 
systems would have serious impact on the coordination effect. However in this 
example, two extreme situations only have been studied. In the real power system, the 
scenario of available information would be far more complex. Hence this result is 
only qualitative. To have a clearer evaluation, we need a suitable way to quantify 
information impact. This is a valuable further research direction. 
 
Information sensitivity 
 
By comparing the results of operative configuration 1 and configuration 2, we 
also find that information impact is not the same for all operational configurations. 
For configuration 1, control results are the same for individually and socially rational 
agents: lack of information makes no impact on coordination of configuration 1 but 
makes serious impact on coordination of configuration 2. Information impact is case 
Scenario of no information 
(Individually rational agents) 
Scenario of full information 
(Socially rational agents) 
 
SO1 SO 2 SO 3 SO 1 SO 2 SO 3 
Bus of shed loads No 3 6 22 23 
3 
5 
24 
Quantity of shed loads [p.u.] 0 1 0.7 1.2 2.8 0.5 
Over loaded rate of subsystem 0 -0.5 0 0 0 0 
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sensitive. Different operative configurations would have different sensitivity for 
information in coordination. It would be a valuable research direction to find some 
way to quantify this sensitivity. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
Recent tragic events point out how malicious attacks to critical infrastructures are 
a very serious concern to modern societies due to the huge impacts they may bring to 
the social welfare in many respects. Among those infrastructure power systems, that 
are the backbone of modern societies, appear as a sensitive target for malicious 
attacks and the issue along with its implications in terms of possible impacts and 
defence strategies have not been yet deeply studied and understood. 
 The present international scenario, prompts for a new approach to power  system 
security able to incorporate the challenge related to the malicious threats in addition to 
the well know natural threats that have been considered since the beginning of the 
electric industry; both physical and cyber attacks need to be considered due to their 
different specificities. Not so much work can be found in literature about this topic 
and practically no applicative tools have been devised and effectively employed. In 
this respect  the additional work outlined by this report is of the utmost importance 
and is surely needed. 
 Mainly two aspects need to be addressed. The risk assessment of the menace 
related to malicious attacks to power systems  is a key point for pointing out the most 
critical components of the infrastructure and for devising the most appropriate 
defence plans, choosing the optimal allocation of the available resources. Moreover, 
after than an attack has been implemented, the best strategy for managing the post-
attack scenario, with special reference to the coordination and cooperation among the 
various entities that are in charge for operating the power systems, need to be planned 
and verified in advance 
 The aspect considered need a proper theoretical framework for modelling the 
issues described and, based on that framework, proper simulation tools, able to 
provide scenario assessment with sensitivity analysis of the relevant factors involved 
(information availability, budget constraints,…) need to be developed and applied by 
system operators and governmental body as an aid in decision making processes. 
 We  provide a conceptual framework for representing the malicious attack to 
which ever critical infrastructure, able to capture its specificity. With respect to the 
natural and accidental threats that have been traditional considered in the protection of 
power systems, the new malicious threats are different in their nature since they are 
based on a strategic interaction between different players; that interaction is a key-
point for modelling the menace and devising protective strategies.  
 In this report, the problem of risk assessment in power systems is addressed 
resorting to a game theory based approach that proved to be effective in modelling the 
strategic interaction. Particularly, the likelihood of attack to different components of 
the power systems can be assessed and used to rank those components in terms of the 
associated risk.  This kind of analysis can be exploited for designing proper defense 
plans and for allocating scarce budgets to the most convenient defense actions in 
protecting sensitive targets.   
 The coordination strategies impact under emergency has been studied with a 
multiagent  system that can effectively simulate the interdependent decision of  set of 
system operators under attacks. It is also proposed to simulate the interactions 
between different stakeholders of the defender to discover the potential new 
vulnerability of infrastructure system due to inappropriate coordination. Based on this 
scenario, simulation of information impacts in the joint defending strategies by multi-
agent system is also discussed. 
 Additional work is underway in different areas. The problem of uncertainty in 
the information owned both from the attacked and the defender and its impact are 
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being modelled with a Bayesian game. The impact of information available to the 
operator under attacks, that may be also cut off as a result of a malicious attack,  is 
being represented in the framework of multiagent system  aiming to point out the 
most critical information that need to be assured with proper actions. Also a proper 
model and software environment for testing ex-ante different coordination rules 
among various system operator in the European framework, is being developed with 
the goal of providing an effective tool to design the most proper coordination rules for 
managing emergency.  
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8. APPENDIX 
 
Abbreviation  
 
ICT Information and Communication Technologies 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
EMS  Energy Management System 
GT Game Theory 
MAS Multi Agent System 
SO System Operator 
AI  Artificial Intelligence 
RL Reinforcement learning 
WoLF Win or Learn Fast 
UCTE Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity 
 
Notation for Game Theory model (5.1) 
 
T set of attack actions containing the action toward multiple components 
simultaneously 
akt k-th action in the attack action set, it contains multiple components to be 
attacked 
F set of defense actions containing the action toward multiple components 
simultaneously 
akf k-th action in the defense action set, it contains multiple components to be 
defended 
BD  equivalent defense budget for measuring the defense resources 
BA equivalent attack budget for measuring the attack resources 
CkA cost of the attacker for implementing the attack action akt 
CkD  cost of the defender for implementing the defense action akf 
Cia cost of attacking the component i 
Cid cost of defending the component i 
SA payoff of the attacker 
SD payoff of the defender 
CA  cost of the attacker to perform an attack action  
CD  cost of the defender to perform a defence action,  
LD  economic value of a loss of load 
γj  equivalent economic value of the load at bus j  
∆Dj  load reduction at bus j 
n  number of buses in the network 
B  nodal admittance matrix, dim (B) = nxn 
θ   vector of bus angle, dim(θ)=n 
P  vector of bus power injection, dim(P)=n 
∆Dj demand variation at bus j 
Dj  demand at bus j, before the attack 
gj  original generated power at the bus j 
∆gj  original generated power and the generation variation at the node j 
gjmax  original generated power and the generation variation at the node j,. 
fl line flow in line l 
Flmax line flow limit of the line l 
nl number of lines in the network 
SAk:  payoff of the attack in the k-th scenario 
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SDk: payoff of the defender in the k-th scenario 
CAj:  cost expressed in monetary value of the attacker for implementing attack 
action j 
CDi:  cost expressed in monetary value to the defender for implementing defense 
action i 
LDk: loss caused by the power system failure in the k-th scenario 
Oi i-th component to be considered as the attack/defense target 
pkA probability for the attacker to take the attack action akt 
pia probability of the component Oi to be attacked 
α successful destroy probability vector of the attack without the 
corresponding defense action taken 
β successful destroy probability vector of the attack with the corresponding 
defense action taken 
nc number of the component considered to be attacked 
 
Notation for MAS  model (5.2) 
 
α :  action performed by agent i 
UEi :  expected utility of agent i by performing α 
UIi :  individual utility of agent i by performing α 
USi :  social utility afforded to the overall system when α is executed 
λi :  vector of social relationships of agent i 
λni :  social relationship of agent i with agent n 
ϕi :  vector of coefficient that weight the importance of those relationships in λi 
ϕni :  coefficient that weight the importance of relationship with agent n 
UjS(α) :  social relationship utility，the utility afforded to the agent in λij by the 
execution of α 
k1 :  coefficient devoted to weight the individual utility on the expected utility 
of an action α 
k2 :  coefficient devoted to weight the social utility on the expected utility of an 
action α 
A :  action scheme which consists of the possible control actions 
Q(s, α) :  Q value for action α at state s 
Ri :  reward for agent i β :  updating rate 
L :  set of all lines 
Pl :  power flow on line l 
Plmax :  maximum power limit of line l 
Ul :  utility of line l 
Ii :  set of internal lines for agent i 
Ti :  set of tie-lines for agent i 
i
kP :  sum of absolute values of power flow at all tie-lines between agent i and 
agent k 
M :  constant number, bigger than the sum of loads possible to be shed in one 
action scheme 
Loadi :  sum of loads shed by agent i in the local subsystem in the implemented 
action scheme 
p.u. per unit 
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Abstract 
This report is intended to provide a conceptual framework for assessing the security risk to power systems assets and 
operations related to malicious attacks. The problem is analysed with reference to all the actors involved and the 
possible targets. The specific nature of the malicious attacks is discussed and representations in terms of strategic 
interaction are proposed.  Models based on Game Theory and Multi Agent Systems techniques specifically developed 
for the representation of malicious attacks against power systems are presented and illustrated with reference to 
applications to small-scale test systems. 
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